Workmen\u27s Compensation -- Injury from Blood Test Required by Public Regulation by King, Robert W., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 36 | Number 1 Article 19
12-1-1957
Workmen's Compensation -- Injury from Blood
Test Required by Public Regulation
Robert W. King Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert W. King Jr., Workmen's Compensation -- Injury from Blood Test Required by Public Regulation, 36 N.C. L. Rev. 110 (1957).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol36/iss1/19
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Workmen's Compensation-Injury from Blood Test Required by
Public Regulation
In the case of King v. Arthur,1 an unsuccessful attempt to draw blood
from claimant-dairy worker's arm for a Wasserman test caused a drain-
ing lesion which incapacitated her for tvo months. Claimant's employer
had ordered her, during working hours, to submit to the test at a speci-
fied clinic. No deduction from her pay was made for the time she was
away from her work. A county health ordinance required dairy workers
to submit to blood tests every six months. Employer-defendant was re-
quired to see that his employees took the test or his dairy would be
subject to "immediate degrading, suspension of permit ' 2 and he could
be found guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, subject to fine or
imprisonment.3 In denying compensation, the court reversed the deputy
commissioner, the full commission, and the superior court.
The basis for the court's decision was that claimant, in submitting
to the test, was obeying, not a requirement of the employer, but of the
public. For this reason her injury did not "arise out of and in the
course of the employment." 4 In deciding this question of first impression
in North Carolina, the court relied primarily on the following two
cases from other jurisdictions.
In Krout v. J. L. Hudson Co.,5 claimant-factory worker's disable-
ment followed a smallpox vaccination given by the board of health as
part of a general anti-epidemic program. Defendant-employer had co-
operated with the board by communicating its request for submission of
all employees to the vaccinations and by excluding unvaccinated em-
ployees from the factory for a twenty-one day safety period. The court
concluded that the injury, if traceable to the vaccination, arose, not
out of the employment, but out of the active agency of the board which
had requested claimant's submission to the vaccination for her own
benefit as well as for the benefit of the general public. The Krout and
1245 N. C. 599, 96 S. E. 2d 847 (1957).
2 U. S. PUBLIc HEALTH SERVICE STANDARD MILK ORDINANCE AND CODE WITH
REvIsIONs UPWARD § 5 (adopted by the County Board of Health of Buncombe
County).3N. C. GENT STAT. § 130-20 (1952).
'See Roberts v. U. S. 0. Camp Shows, 91 Cal. App. 2d 884, 205 P. 2d 1116
(1949); Smith v. Brown Paper Mill Co., 152 So. 700 (La. App. 1934); Neudeck
v. Ford Motor Co., 249 Mich. 690, 229 N. W. 438 (1930); Sanders v. Children's
Aid Soc'y, 262 N. Y. 655, 188 N. E. 107 (1933) ; Spicer Mfg. Co. v. Tucker, 127
Ohio St. 421, 188 N. E. 870 (1934) ; Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, Inc., 206 S. C.
103, 33 S. E. 2d 81 (1945) ; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mitchell, 27 S. W. 2d
600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). In these cases injury resulted from vaccinations or
blood tests performed by the employer's physician or nurse. Compensation was
allowed on a finding that the employer required the injection, even though it had
been requested or recommended by the board of health.
200 Mich. 287, 166 N.W. 848 (1918).
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King cases here differ, because in King claimant was not an intended
beneficiary of the blood test.
In Industrial Cozm'n v. Messinger,8 a five to two decision, the
facts were more nearly the same. The restauranteur-employer, under
compulsion of law, directed waitress-claimant to obtain the blood test
which caused the injury. Two significant differences appear in this
case: a) claimant was not ordered to go to any particular place to have
the test but rather went to a physician of her own choosing; and b) the
test was made when claimant was off work. The basis for the majority's
decision was the same as that of the court in the King case.
The differences mentioned tend to lessen the persuasiveness of the
cited cases as authority for the holding of the court in the principal case.
In support of the court's decision, however, lies the theory that the
employer in implementing statutory requirements acts merely as the
agent of the governing body.7 For this reason, justice would seem to
demand that he not be made to pay for resulting injuries as he would
be if he had ordered the injury-producing act in the exercise of his
unfettered discretion.8 Also it might be argued that charging employers
for injuries arising out of statutory requirements would tend to dis-
courage ventures into heavily regulated areas of industry. But con-
sidering the circumstances of the principal case and the philosophy and
purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act, it is felt that the result
reached in the King case is unduly harsh.9
Schneider has said that "an accident arises from the employment if it
ensues from a risk reasonably incident to the employment"; he further
states that the risk may be one only indirectly connected with the em-
ployment.10 Our court has said the injury "must in some reasonable
' 116 Colo. 451, 181 P. 2d 816 (1947).
'7See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mitchell, 27 S. W. 2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930).
' This argument is akin to that advanced in the old "compulsory pilot" cases.
In these cases the issue was whether ship owners should be held liable under
respondeat superior for collision damage caused by the negligence of pilots whom
the ship masters were compelled by law to accept. The owners successfully con-
tended that it was unjust to hold them since they were allowed no choice in the
matter. Dampskibsselskabet Atalanta A/S v. United States, 31 F. 2d 961 (5th Cir.
1929); Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. La Com. Gen. Transatlantique, 182 U. S.
406 (1901), 4 TuL- L. R-v. 133 (1929). These cases presented a problem analogous
to that of the principal case, viz., what degree of public interference makes it proper
to take the affected aspect of a business out of the business for the purpose of de-
termining entrepreneur liability? The magnitude of public usurpation of the
owners' control in the pilot cases is obviously far greater than that occasioned by
the blood test ordinance of the principal case.
'A generally acceted rule applicable to all cases arising under workmen's
compensation laws was set out in Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, Inc., 206 S. C. 103,
110, 33 S. E. 2d 81, 83-84 (1945) ; "[Wie must keep in mind the established rule
that the Act should be given a liberal construction in furtherance of the purposes
for which it was designed .... .106 ScHNEmER, WoRax[EN's COMPENsATION § 1542 (d) (1948).
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sense spring from and be traceable to the employment."" The above
language is considered especially pertinent to the circumstances sur-
rounding claimant's injury in this case. She was required by the law and
by her employer to submit to a blood test every six months. The
reasons therefor make her injury "traceable" to the employment and
the risk of such injury "reasonably incident" to her employment. The
county, through the ordinance, did not seek to discover or prevent
disease in dairy workers for the benefit of the workers. The purpose
of the regulation was to minimize the possibility that dairies would en-
danger the health of those who drank their milk. Thus the relationship
between the blood test and the employer's milk would seem to supply
the requisite connection between the injury and the employment.
Another aspect of the case and one which courts have frequently
turned to in deciding the compensation question is: Who benefited from
the act which produced the injury?' 2  In the King case, the blood test
was required out of concern over the possibility that the employer's
milk might become a disease carrier. The direct beneficiaries were the
customers of dairymen who carried out the mandates of the ordinance.
Any benefit realized by an employee from the test was only incidental
to the purpose of the law. Two benefits accruing to the employer from
a measure aimed at keeping his product free from disease germs are
readily seen: freedom from lawsuits and uninterrupted production. It
would seem that the order was at least "calculated to further . . . in-
directly, the master's business"' 3 and this is no less true because com-
pelled by law.
The philosophy behind the Compensation Act would also seem to
point to compensation in this case. That philosophy is that the financial
burdens of industry-connected injuries should be added, like any other
production expense, to the cost of a particular industry's product and
paid for by the product's consumers.' 4 The blood test submitted to by
the claimant was an integral part of the process of putting wholesome
milk in the hands of consumers. In accordance with the act's philosophy,
11 Vause v. Vause Equipment Co., 233 N. C. 88, 92, 63 S. E. 2d 173, 176 (1951).
"1In Hildebrand v. McDowell Furniture Co., 212 N. C. 100, 109, 193 S. E. 294,
301 (1937), it was said that the phrase "out of and in the course of the employment
embraces . . . those accidents which happen to a servant while he is engaged in
the discharge of some function or duty ... which is calculated to further, directly
or indirectly, the master's business."
" See note 12 supra.
1This philosophy was set out in Vause v. Vause Equipment Co., 233 N. C.
88, 92, 63 S. E. 2d 173, 176 (1951), quoting from Cox v. Kansas City Refining Co.,
108 Kan. 320, 322, 195 Pac. 863, 865 (1921), as follows: "[T]he wear and tear of
human beings in modern industry should be charged to the industry .... And while
such compensation is presumably charged to the industry ... eventually it becomes
a part of the fair money cost of the industrial product, to be paid for by the
general public patronizing such products."
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it might be contended that injury resulting therefrom should ultimately
be paid for by the consumers regardless of what compelled this par-
ticular part of the process.
A search of the cases and other authorities has revealed no instance,
with the exception of the Krout, Messinger, and King cases, where an
employer has defended on the grounds that an order of his was in fact
a public order; and, as shown, these three cases are confined to the
area of needle injections of some sort. In view of the great amount
of public regulation of industries, especially those in the food and drug
field, a question is raised as to the infrequent use of the defense. The
King case could induce greater reliance on it in the future. In North
Carolina the regulation of dairies is left in large degree to local authori-
ties15 and state agencies.1 6 Bakeries are regulated in greater detail by
the legislature 7 -even to the point of prescribing when employees shall
wash their hands.' 8 Many of these regulations could conceivably result
in employee injury. If a bakery worker scalds his hands while com-
plying with the clean hands requirement, would a denial of compensation
be upheld on the basis of the King decision?
If an employer chooses to engage in a business which by its nature
requires public regulation to make the business safe for his customers and
the public in general, it is felt that he, and ultimately his customers,
should bear any extra expense occasioned by such regulation. For this
reason it is hoped that the rule in the King case will be confined to its
facts and will not be invoked to deny compensation in other cases where
the employer's orders and public regulation coincide.
ROBERT W. KING, JR.
'
5 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 130-19 (1952).
'IN. C. G N. STAT. § 106-267 (1952) (Board of Agriculture); N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 130-4 (1952) (Board of Health); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.8(c) (Supp.
1955) (Milk Commission).
'
7 See N. C. GEra. STAT. §§ 106-220 through 106-222 (1952).
'
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 106-222 (1952).
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